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HE cost of aviation fuel increased 
244% between July 2004 and July 
2008, becoming the largest operating 
cost item for airlines (ATA, 2010)1. 
Figure 1 depicts a conceptual model 
showing the linkages between the air 
transportation system and economy.2 
Changes in the effective cost of fuel 
affect the air transportation system on: 
(1) the supply-side, through pricing 
and scheduling, networks and fleet; 
and (2) the demand-side, through the 
economy. A key contributor to the 
effective cost of fuel is the price of 
crude oil. As shown in Figure 2, jet 
fuel prices surged from an average of 
$0.72/gallon in January 2000 to a peak 
of  $3.82/gallon in July 2008, trending 
closely with crude oil prices. During 
the period of the highest rate of 
increase, July 2007-08, jet fuel prices 
climbed 82%1. It is expected that 
increases in the effective cost of fuel 
impact the balance of supply and 
demand in the system, resulting in 
changes in airline supply (i.e. network 
and fleet). There is a need to 
understand how fuel price increases 
affected air transportation network and 
fleet assignment decisions, and the 
effectiveness of government policies 
in meeting socioeconomic and 
environmental objectives.  
 As shown in Figure 1, the effective 
cost of fuel is influenced by crude oil 
prices as well as domestic and 
international market-based carbon 
policies, such as cap and trade and carbon taxes. Peak oil theory predicts continued volatility and increasing costs of 
oil-based fuels while new environmentally driven charges are expected to add to fuel costs, impacting airlines’ 
financial performance, technology and operational change uptake, and decisions with regard to the provision of air 
services nationwide. These future scenarios motivate the need to understand how air transportation networks and 
fleet will evolve with increasing effective fuel costs. 
 This research analyzed the continental US system during the 2004-08 fuel price surge to improve understanding 
of how air transportation networks and fleet may evolve under volatile and upward trending effective fuel costs. We 
use two time periods – July 2004-08 and July 2007-08 - as natural experiments to understand short- and medium-
term effects of fuel cost increase and volatility in the behavior of airlines in a competitive system. As a second step, 
we extrapolate the effects of sustained effective fuel cost increases on how airline-passenger interactions may 
evolve. 
 Section II outlines our research approach, followed by an analysis of the impacts of the fuel price surge in 
Section III. Potential explanations of the effects of the fuel price surge are described in Section IV. Future effective 
fuel cost increase scenarios, possible long-term consequences of the evolution of the system observed in the time 
periods of the study, potential fuel efficiency measures, and the role of government in mitigating negative impacts 
are discussed in Section V. Section VI summarizes and presents the main conclusions from this work. 
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Figure 1. Air Transportation System and Effective Fuel Cost 
Macroeconomic Interaction Model. Adapted from (Tam and Hansman, 
2003)2. 
 
Figure 2. Time Periods of Study Selected due to Trends in Crude Oil 
and Jet Fuel Prices. Source: (ATA, 2010)1 
 





II. Research Approach 
 The 2004-08 period provided a natural experiment that is used as a case study to evaluate how fuel price 
increases affected air transportation networks and fleet decisions. Comparative analyses were performed over two 
time periods: (1) July 2004-08, and (2) July 2007-08. The July 2004-08 time period was selected to demonstrate 
medium-term trends in airline decisions when facing increasing fuel costs, while the July 2007-08 time period was 
selected to examine short-term trends. Primary focus was placed on the July 2007-08 period, as the rate of fuel cost 
increase was greatest and airline decisions were likely to have been made under forecasts of continued high, or 
increasing, fuel costs. Comparing changes between the same month in subsequent years avoided introducing 
seasonal effects in the analysis. By July 2004, US domestic supply (as measured by available seat miles, ASM) had 
recovered to pre-9/11 levels and one year had past since the SARS pandemic of May-July 2003. Also, US gross 
domestic product (GDP) was increasing during this time period, peaking in nominal terms in Q3 2008. Therefore, 
the effects of the demand shift due to the 2008-2010 economic crisis do not impact the analysis. 
 The air transportation system is influenced by multiple factors, as shown in Figure 1. Between Q3 2007 and 
2008, real GDP remained relatively constant. There were no major US air safety or security incidents during this 
period, and US passenger carrier operations did not result in any fatalities. Airline competition, as measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)*, increased marginally from 0.082 to 0.083. Airline labor costs, as reported by 
the Air Transport Association (2010)3, decreased 3.9% between Q3 2007 and 2008. As the rate of change of these 
factors was dwarfed by the escalation of fuel costs, it was assumed that the effect of the increase in the cost of fuel 
on the air transportation system was greater than other factors during the July 2007-08 time period. During the July 
2004-08 time period, several major US carriers entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, three accidents occurred involving 
passenger fatalities**4, and real GDP increased 8.6%.5 This time period is used to put changes observed July 2007-08 
into historical perspective and to identify medium-term trends in airline behavior. This study does not account for 
the effect of changes in economic activity, or other exogenous variables, on the air transportation system. 
 Many airlines dampen fuel cost volatility by adopting financial fuel price hedging strategies. Over the time frame 
of this study, successful hedging strategies likely provided significant cost advantages to individual airlines. The 
magnitude of the fuel price increase implies that, in the future, hedging prices will increase and will account for such 
extremes in volatility. Therefore, fuel price hedging cannot be considered a sufficient measure of protection against 
systemic fuel price increases.  Actions other than hedging are the subject of this paper, including changes to airline 
network and fleet assignments. 
 The data used for these analyses was obtained from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) Form 41 
databases.6 For data consistency and availability reasons, the analysis was generally limited in scope to the 
continental US domestic air transportation system. Data was filtered to exclude cargo service, military flights, 
repositioning flights (i.e. departures 
performed with zero passengers 
reported), and sightseeing (i.e. 
departures performed whose origin 
and destination were the same airport). 
Based on these datasets, a comparative 
analysis of the continental US air 
transportation network and fleet at the 
airport and route levels was 
conducted. In addition, the effect of 
changes in air service provision on 
population access was evaluated. 
To provide potential causal 
explanations for the observed effects 
on network and fleet from the case 
study, complementary analyses were 
conducted, including: the evaluation 
                                                           
* Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was calculated as the sum of the squares of the domestic revenue passenger mile (RPM) 
market share of all US passenger carriers reported in BTS Form 41 Schedule T2. 
** US carrier accidents involving passenger fatalities, July 2004-08: (1) 0/19/04 Kirksville, MO, Corporate Airlines, British 
Aerospace Jetstream 32, (2) 12/19/05 Miami, FL, Chalks Ocean Airways, Grumman G-73T, (3) 08/27/06 Lexington, KY, 
Comair, Bombardier CRJ-100 (NTSB, 2010)4.  
 
 
Figure 3. Trends in US Airline Industry Unit Operating Costs.  
Data source: (ATA, 2010)3. 





of aircraft fuel intensity, airline economics, and airfare time series analyses. Finally, effects observed in the case 
study were extrapolated to various scenarios in which effective increases in fuel costs are expected to discuss their 
potential consequences.  
III. Investigation of the Impacts of the 2004-2008 Fuel Price Surge 
Fuel became the greatest expense for the aviation industry in 2006 when it surpassed labor, the second largest 
airline cost component, as shown in Figure 3. A combination of increasing fuel costs and decreasing labor costs due 
to industry restructuring led to this change in share of direct operating costs. As fuel costs have become a larger 
share of industry revenue, changes in the effective cost of fuel have had a greater impact on airline decisions and 
profit margins. The impacts on network structure, changes to passenger access to the air transportation system, and 





 Airport HubClass ΔDepartures 
1 Kenmore, WA NonHub 271 ∞ 
2 Santa Rosa, CA NonHub 182 ∞ 
3 New York, NY NonHub 137 ∞ 
4 Plattsburgh, NY EAS 116 ∞ 
5 Phoenix, AZ NonHub 90 ∞ 
6 Del Rio, TX NonHub 84 ∞ 
7 Alamogordo, NM NonHub 59 ∞ 
8 New York, NY NonHub 57 ∞ 
9 Palmdale, CA NonHub 57 ∞ 
10 Vernal, UT EAS 56 ∞ 
….. 
466 Columbia, MO EAS -109 -100% 
467 Enid, OK NonHub -124 -100% 
468 El Dorado, AR EAS -130 -100% 
469 Watertown, NY EAS -152 -100% 
470 Hot Springs, AR EAS -155 -100% 
471 Prescott, AZ EAS -156 -100% 
472 Trenton, NJ NonHub -161 -100% 
473 Lake Havasu City, AZ NonHub -166 -100% 
474 Peach Springs, AZ NonHub -227 -100% 




 Airport HubClass ΔDepartures 
1 Charlotte, NC Large 4307 27.8% 
2 New York, NY Large 3933 50.5% 
3 Houston, TX Large 3336 19.0% 
4 Denver, CO Large 2812 12.3% 
5 Philadelphia, PA Large 2467 16.5% 
6 San Francisco Large 2069 18.5% 
7 Las Vegas, NV Large 1150 7.7% 
8 San Diego, CA Large 1128 14.7% 
9 Indianapolis, IN Medium 849 17.0% 
10 Dallas/Ft. Wrth (DAL) Medium 805 21.8% 
….. 
466 Boston, MA Large -901 -5.8% 
467 Albany, NY Small -1245 -38.3% 
468 Detroit, MI Large -1803 -9.1% 
469 Chicago, IL (MDW) Large -2261 -21.8% 
470 Chicago, IL (ORD) Large -2566 -7.0% 
471 Minneapolis, MN Large -3411 -16.9% 
472 Washington,DC (IAD) Large -4287 -27.6% 
473 Dallas/Ft.Wrth (DFW) Large -4872 -16.0% 
474 Pittsburgh, PA Medium -6551 -53.5% 
475 Covington, KY Large -7205 -38.1% 
 
Figure 5. July 2004-2008 Absolute Changes in US Airports’ Continental US Passenger Departures and Top 10 
Absolute Gains and Losses. Data Source:  (BTS, 2010)6. 
 
Figure 4. July 2004-2008 Relative Changes in US Airports’ Continental US Passenger Departures and Top 10 
Relative Gains and Losses. Data Source:  (BTS, 2010)6. 
 
 





A. Impacts on Network Structure 
 The comparative analysis of the network structure July 2004-08 and July 2007-08 showed that a reallocation of 
resources throughout the continental US air transportation network occurred. July 2004-08, the aggregate number of 
departures performed were reduced by 2.8%, while this number dropped by 1.6% July 2007-08. Some airports 
experienced greater reductions in service than others. Figures 4 and 5 show relative and absolute changes in 
passenger departures performed at continental US airports July 2004-08. Changes in departures at individual airports 
are used as a proxy for access to the national air transportation system. A reduction in access to the system is 
expected to have social and economic effects for the airport catchment area as passengers and businesses are forced 
to find alternative modes of transportation, likely resulting in increased travel time. The relative and absolute 
changes in airport traffic demonstrate volatility at small and large airports throughout the country. 
 Figure 6 categorizes airports by the number of departures per day in July 2007. Small airports, with fewer than 
~300 departures per day, lost relatively more traffic than larger airports July 2007-08. These small airports 
correspond to non-hub, small hub, and medium hub classes, as defined by the FAA (2008)7 based on the number of 
passenger boardings in the year 2007, as shown in Table 1.8 
 Table 1 also shows that small airports were disproportionately affected. July 2007-08, 70 airports lost all service 
and 32 airports gained service, resulting in a net loss of 38 airports. The net change July 2004-08 was a loss of 10 
 
Figure 6. July 2007-08 Relative Changes in Airports’ Continental Passenger 
Departures per Day, Binned by Airports’ Size. 
 NonHub Small Medium Large 
NonHub -2922 -358 -2549 -359 
 -18% -20% -24% -0.4% 
Small  132 420 -1365 
  15% 2.6% -1.0% 
Medium   -3633 -3787 
   -11% -1.7% 
Large    1849 
    0.7% 
   Total: -12572 
    -1.6% 
Table 2. Changes in Continental US 
Passenger Departures by Airport Class, July 
2007-08. Percentage values represent the 
relative change in number of departures 
performed from each connection class in July 
2007. Data Source:  (BTS, 2010)6 
 
Figure 7. Origin Airport Class Change in Departures. 










Large ≥1% 32 32 32 
Medium 0.25-1% 37 37 37 
Small 0.05-0.25% 63 63 63 
NonHub 0-0.05% 245 276 257 
EAS* 0-0.05% 98 95 76 
 Total: 475 503 465 
 
Table 1. Number of Airports by Class with 
Continental US Passenger Departures. 
Airport classes held constant from the full year 
2007 for analyses.  
 
*Indicates airports serviced by Essential Air 
Service (EAS) subsidized routes. All EAS 
airports were NonHub airports. 
 
Data Source:  (BTS, 2010)6 (FAA, 2008)7 
(Office of Aviation Analysis, 2010)8 





airports with service. Airports that lost all service were generally small airports with fewer than seven domestic 
departures performed per day in July 2007. GAO (2009)9 reported that 38 airports with routes receiving Essential 
Air Service (EAS) subsidies lost all service July 2007-08 (this is discussed further in Section V). It is expected that 
the social and economic effects of reductions in access to the national air transportation system would be greatest at 
airports that lost all service or experienced a prolonged period without service.  
 The July 2007-08 comparative network analysis was also performed at the origin-destination flight segment 
level. During this period, continental US departures were reduced by over 12,500. Table 2 shows the changes in 
departures between airport classes. Figure 7 shows that non-hub airports lost relatively more departures over both of 
the study periods while large-to-large hub connections increased. Small communities, serviced by non-hub airports, 
lost relatively more access to the national air transportation system than large communities. 
 Cento (2009)10 proposed using the Freeman network centrality index to measure the strength of hub-and-spoke 
vs. point-to-point networks. In a pure hub-and-spoke network, all airports would be connected through one hub. In a 
pure point-to-point network, all airports would be connected directly to every other airport in the network. The 
Freeman network centrality index uses the weighted average of paths through each airport connecting every other 
airport in the network, normalized by the maximimum value achieved by a pure hub-and-spoke network. Therefore, 
for a pure hub-and-spoke network, the Freeman index is 1, while for a fully connected point-to-point network, the 
Freeman index is 0. The reduction in the number of non-hub airports, as well as the reductions in connections 
originating in non-hub and medium hub airports, led to a strengthening of hub-and-spoke networks July 2007-08. 
System-wide, the Freeman index increased from 0.17 to 0.26, its largest change in the decade.  
 It was also found that during this time period, 
a relative shift towards longer haul flights 
occurred. The average stage length of continental 
US passenger departures increased from 609 
miles in July 2004 to 626 miles (July 2007) and 
632 miles (July 2008) due to the addition of long 
haul connections and reductions in the number of 
short-haul connections.  
B. Impacts on Access to the Air 
Transportation System  
 During the period of steepest increase in fuel 
prices, July 2007-08, service was reduced for 
small and remote communities. For each of the 
airports that lost all service, the distance to the 
next nearest airport with traffic was calculated 
using Google Maps (2009)11, as shown in Figure 
8. The average driving distance to the next 
nearest airport with service was 57 miles, 
corresponding to an average driving time of 75 
minutes. The maximum driving distance was 208 
miles, from Miles City, MN to Sheridan, WY.  
 The percentage of the continental US 
population living within 40 miles of an airport 
with regular service dropped 1.4% to 88.9% July 
2007-08, as shown in Figure 9. This was 
determined by calculating the great circle distance 
from year 2000 US census SF3 tract internal 
coordinates to the nearest airport with atleast one 
reported passenger departure per week, and 
cumulating the percent of the population.12  The 
number of airports with regular service increased 
July 2004-07, largely due to increases in Essential 
Air Service (EAS) funding, as discussed in 
Section V. The drop in the number of airports 
with regular service July 2007-08 resulted from a 
number of airlines serving small communities 
 
Figure 8. Next Nearest Airport with Passenger Departures to 
Airports that Lost All Service, July 2007-08.  
Data Source: (Google, 2009)11 
 
 
Figure 9. Continental US Access to Airports with Regular 
Service. Data Source:  (BTS, 2010)6 (GeoLytics, 2000)12 





suffering financially. The selection of new air service providers for EAS subsidized routes restored service to most 
airports by July 2009. Figure 9 shows that access to the national air transportation system for  a significant portion of 
the population is sensitive to the financial viability of regional and commuter airlines, as well as government 
subsidies. 
C. Impacts on Airlines 
Airlines suffered financially during the fuel 
price surge, although regional and commuter 
airlines suffered relatively more July 2007-08. 
Eleven of 107 (10.3%) US passenger carriers 
ceased operations July 2007-08, of which ten 
were regional or commuter airlines. Virgin 
America and Lynx Aviation commenced 
operations during this time period. Although 
representing a large percentage of total airlines, 
airlines ceasing passenger operations accounted 
for only 1.5% of domestic ASM in July 2007. 
Thirteen passenger carriers declared bankruptcy 
in 2004-2005, including legacy carriers US 
Airways, Delta Air Lines and Northwest 
Airlines, although many of these carriers 
continued operations. The fuel surge of July 
2007-08 demonstrated that smaller, regionally focused airlines tend to have less ability to handle the financial stress 
caused by fuel price increase and volatility. 
 Grouping US carriers as Network Legacy Carriers (NLC), Low Cost Carriers (LCC), Regional, and Commuter 
(as defined in Appendix A), Table 3 shows that NLCs reduced domestic capacity most aggressively while LCCs 
added domestic available seat miles (ASM) market share, which increased from 18% in July 2004 to 26% in July 
2008. Regional airlines were slower to cut capacity July 2007-08, with a 3.1% drop in ASM, but suffered a larger 
relative drop in demand with a 6.8% drop in revenue passenger miles (RPM).  
 Much of the volatility in the number of airports with service was due to the cessation of operations of Air 
Midwest and Big Sky Airlines. These airlines were the sole carriers serving 20 communities of the 70 that lost all 
service. This demonstrates the sensitivity of small community access to individual airlines, especially regional 
airlines that may not have the same access to financing as large airlines.  
 While US carriers reduced domestic capacity, NLCs increased international capacity 6.6% July 2007-08, as 
shown in Table 4, continuing recent trends. Although LCCs showed large relative gains in international traffic July 
2004-08, LCCs provided less than 3% of US carrier international ASM in July 2008 while NLCs provided 94%. 
This increase in international capacity is part of a longer-term trend: NLC international ASMs increased 28% July 
2004-08. These figures indicate a change in the primary provider of air transport in continental US as LCCs increase 
their market share, NLCs transfer capacity to international routes, and regional carriers focus on domestic routes. 
IV. Potential Factors Influencing Airline and Passenger Decisions during the Fuel Price Surge 
This section proposes possible explanations of the observed effects on the air transportation system during the 
fuel price surge. It should be noted that the US domestic aviation industry is highly competitive and that numerous 
exogenous factors influence stakeholder decisions. These exogenous factors include: economic activity, financial 
markets, competing modes of transportation, competition among airlines, airport construction, regulations, foreign 
affairs, terrorist events, and security concerns. This study aims to focus on the impacts of increases in the effective 
cost of fuel. Therefore, other exogenous events will not be discussed. 
As shown in Figure 1, increases in the effective cost of fuel impact the air transportation system through the 
supply-side and the demand-side of the market for air transport. Supply-side effects include increases in direct 
operating costs of airlines, resulting in changes to networks and fleet assignments. Demand-side effects are due to 
reductions in economic activity, as well as passenger and freight sensitivity to fare increases.  
Bruekner and Zhang (2010)13 explored the effect of airline emission charges on airfares, airline service quality, 
aircraft design features, and network structure by developing a theoretical model of competing duopoly airlines. 
Emission charges were included as an increase in the effective cost of fuel, although the volume of passengers was 
kept fixed to avoid complexity. Their research showed an increase in fuel price will lead to higher fares, lower flight 
 July 2004-08  July 2007-08 
 RPM ASM  RPM ASM 
NLC -2.1% -2.9%  -4.5% -2.8% 
LCC 12.4% 12.1%  2.3% 5.9% 
Regional 1.1% 0.8%  -6.8% -3.1% 
4 
 
Table 3. Annualized Changes in US Carrier Domestic Supply 
and Demand, by Airline Class. Data Source:  (BTS, 2010)6 
 
 July 2004-08  July 2007-08 
 RPM ASM  RPM ASM 
NLC 7.1% 7.1%  4.5% 6.6% 
LCC 18.4% 16.9%  -2.3% -7.0% 
Regional -5.4% -6.0%  -25% -24% 
 
Table 4. Annualized Changes in US Carrier International 
Supply and Demand, by Airline Class.6 
 
  





frequency, a higher load factor, more fuel-efficient aircraft, and an unchanged aircraft size. Further, using a 
simplified network model, they showed that hub and spoke networks are strengthened by increases in effective fuel 
cost, except under certain conditions. This theoretical model helps to explain some of the effects observed during the 
fuel price surge. 
A. Supply-Side  
 Changes in the share of direct operating costs require airlines to alter their resource allocation. As fuel costs per 
ASM exceeded 5¢ (as shown in Figure 3), airlines altered their fleet assignments and network structures. While 
decreases in short-haul connections to thin demand markets has already been discussed, two other trends in airline 
decisions during the fuel price surge were observed: (1) a reduction in the utilization of fuel intensive aircraft, and 
(2) increased costs passed through to passengers. 
 
1. Operating Fleet 
 Aircraft fuel intensity, measured in gallons 
of fuel per available seat mile (ASM), varies by 
aircraft type and engine due to differences in 
design, weight, operations, and level of 
technology. Figure 10 shows variations in fuel 
intensity within and between aircraft 
classes.††14 Regional jets are generally more 
fuel intensive than turboprops of the same seat 
size, when adjusted for operating range. With 
increasing effective fuel costs, airlines have an 
economic incentive to reduce utilization of fuel 
intensive aircraft. The number of regional jets 
in US carrier fleets has increased dramatically 
since introduced in the 1990s. Increased fuel 
cost and changes to pilot scope clauses arrested 
this trend in 2006. The number of operating 
regional jets by US carriers increased 27% 
between Q3 2004-2006 to 1605, but declined 
3.6% to 1548 in Q3 2008. When fuel prices 
spiked in 2008, airlines increased the number of 
operating turboprops in their fleets by ~41% 
from Q3 2007 to 274 (BTS Form 41 T2, 
2010).6 Airlines increased utilization of 
turboprops and reintegrated parked turboprops 
into their fleet when fuel costs increased 
sharply.   
 Figure 11 shows that airlines increased the 
miles flown of fuel-efficient aircraft while 
decreasing the miles flown of fuel inefficient 
aircraft July 2004-08. With a permanent 
increase in fuel cost, airlines are likely to 
replace fuel intensive aircraft with newer, fuel 
efficient models. These decisions could lead to 
a renewed interest in turboprop technology, 
reduced regional jet purchases, and will likely 
lead to substantial interest in next generation, 
fuel efficient aircraft, such as Boeing’s 787, 
Airbus’s A350, and Bombardier’s CSeries. 
 
                                                           
††Aircraft fuel intensity derived from Piano-X aircraft database. Fuel burn was calculated using the aircraft’s maximum payload 
at each R1 range quintile. Fuel intensity was calculated as the weighted average of fuel burn per available seat mile (ASM) at 
each R1 range quintile, based on 2006 operating range frequencies. 
 
Figure 10. Aircraft Type Fuel Intensity.  
Data Source: Piano-X Aircraft Database14. 
 
 
Figure 11. Change in Revenue Miles Flown by Aircraft Type Fuel 
Intensity (Aggregated for all US Airlines, July 2004-08)14 
 





2. Fuel Cost Passed on to the Consumer in the Form of Airfare Increases 
 Competition in the airline industry 
has resulted in a reduction in real fares 
since deregulation. Increased fuel costs 
have resulted in increased costs passed 
through to passengers in the form of fuel 
surcharges, increased fares, and de-
bundling of services, such as checked 
bags and onboard meals. BTS (2009)15 
reported average domestic air fares in 
the third quarter of 2008 to be $362, up 
10.4% from the third quarter of 2007, 
and up 22% from the post-9/11 third 
quarter low of $297 in 2004. Increased 
airfares were not distributed evenly 
across the system. Passengers originating 
in non-hub airports experienced a 3.9% 
increase in the average airfares to $479 
in Q3 2008 (BTS, 2010).16 Although 
passengers originating in non-hub 
airports generally face higher fares, they 
experienced a relatively smaller increase 
in airfares, likely due to these 
passengers’ shorter average segment 
stage lengths. Non-hub airports are 
generally connected to medium and large 
hub airports by short-haul connections 
flown in turboprops and regional jets. As 
stage length decreases, fuel cost as a 
percent of operating cost decreases, 
overtaken by maintenance and labor 
costs. Thus short-haul fares are less 
sensitive to fuel cost increase (Babikian, 
2002)17. 
 Figure 12 shows changes in US 
airline’s cost per available seat mile 
(ASM) and revenue per ASM between 
the third quarters of 2007 and 2008. Cost 
per ASM increased 3.00¢, of which  
2.20¢ was due to the increase in fuel costs. This increase in cost was only offset by a 0.73¢ increase in revenue per 
ASM, eliminating the 2007 positive profit in the US airline industry (ATA, 2010)3. Between Q3 2004-08, fuel cost 
per ASM increased 3.57¢ while revenue per ASM increased only 2.48¢. 
 As shown in Figure 1, increased costs impact supply through airfare pricing. Increased prices impact demand 
through the price elasticity of demand for air transportation. In the short- and medium-term time periods of this 
analysis, all of the increases in fuel costs were not passed through to passengers. In the longer term, with increased 
effective fuel costs, airfares will need to increase and/or non-fuel related costs will need to be trimmed to 
compensate for the change in direct operating costs, or the industry will not be financially sustainable. 
B. Demand-Side 
 The amount of fuel cost increase passed on to the consumer has an effect on demand for air transport through the 
price elasticity of demand. In general, when other influences on demand remain unchanged, a higher price for a 
product results in a lower quantity demanded. The price elasticity measures the sensitivity of demand to changes in 
the price. If the change in quantity demanded is greater than the change in price, the demand is said to be elastic, 
whereas if the change in quantity demanded is less than the change in price, the demand is said to be inelastic. 
 
 
Figure 12. Cost and Revenue per ASM (Excluding Taxes) - Q3 2007 
and 2008 Comparison. Data Source: (ATA, 2010)3 
 
 
Figure 13. Price Elasticities of Demand for Air Transportation.  
Source: (Gillen, Morrison, & Stewart, 2008)18  





 Gillen, Morrison, and Stewart (2008)18 compiled multiple studies on the price elasticity of demand for air 
transportation, as shown in Figure 13. The price elasticity of demand was found to differ between short-haul and 
long haul travel, domestic and international, as well as between leisure (optional) and business (non-optional) travel. 
Short-haul, leisure travel was found to be the most price elastic while long-haul international business travel was 
found to be the least. Alternative modes of travel, such as rail, bus, and automobiles, are close substitutes to short-
haul air transportation, whereas there are no close substitutes to long-haul air travel. It is expected that demand for 
air transport is less elastic for longer flights, and, as international travel is generally spread over more time than 
domestic travel - making airfare a smaller proportion of the overall trip cost - international travelers are generally 
less sensitive to changes in ticket prices.  
 During the period of study it was found that connections to short-haul markets were reduced, average stage 
length increased, and international traffic grew. Airlines made strategic decisions on how to maintain revenues while 
facing higher operating costs. This led to reductions in service to short-haul markets in which passengers are more 
sensitive to airfare increases, and increases in international traffic for passengers less sensitive to airfare increases. 
Further, Airbus (2010)19 forecasts North American domestic passenger traffic to grow at 1.6%/year for the period 
2009-2018, while passenger traffic to international destinations is forecasted to grow at a rate of 4.5%/year over the 
same time period. As the continental US market approaches saturation, airlines are seeking higher growth markets 
on which they are able to maintain higher yields (i.e. unit revenue). 
V. Discussion 
The potential for future increases in the effective cost of fuel could have significant long-term social and 
economic consequences, and could increase the rate at which commercial aviation adopts fuel efficient technologies 
and mitigating measures to reduce carbon emissions. In this section, behavior observed in the case study time 
periods is extrapolated to discuss potential future trends in the US air transportation system and their consequences. 
A. Factors Influencing Future Effective Fuel Cost 
 Two possible scenarios would result in higher effective fuel costs for commercial aviation: (1) government 
policy, and (2) crude oil markets.  
 
1. Government Policy 
 International accords or national governments may act to curtail carbon emissions by instituting emission taxes 
or cap and trade policies. This would increase direct operating costs associated with fuel burn through the need to 
purchase offsets on carbon exchanges or pay increased fuel taxes. It is expected that such measures would be phased 
in over a number of years, providing an adjustment period, and would not lead to a similar spike in fuel costs as 
experienced during the fuel price surge.  
 The American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454 (commonly referred to as the Waxman-Markey 
Climate and Energy Bill) passed the House of Representatives in July 2009, but did not become law. Under 
Waxman-Markey, the EPA (2009)20 estimated a permit to emit one ton of carbon dioxide would be worth $11-$15 
in 2012 (2005 dollars), increasing to $22-$28 in 2025 (2005 dollars). Assuming a system fuel intensity of 0.016 
gallons/ASM, emissions permits would result in increased unit costs in the range 0.2-0.5¢/ASM for airlines, 
representing ~8-21% of the unit cost increase that occurred Q3 2007-08. This cost increase is significant and would 
be in addition to the cost of any increase in market prices for crude oil, likely reducing the economy’s demand for 
oil, resulting in secondary effects on forecasted business-as-usual oil prices. 
 
2. Crude Oil Markets 
 International markets may continue to provide high volatility in the price of crude oil and jet fuel. Further, under 
peak oil scenarios, the worldwide supply of oil would decrease, resulting in increasing fuel costs if demand for oil 
does not slacken. Without economical, technologically mature, and safety certified energy substitutes, commercial 
aviation would continue to rely on oil derived jet fuel at increased prices. EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook (2010)21 
reference case forecasts jet fuel prices to reach $2.93/gallon by 2020 and $3.58/gallon by 2035 (2008 dollars), as 
shown in Figure 14. The low/high oil price case provides forecasts depending on more optimistic/pessimistic 
assumptions for economic access to non-OPEC resources and for OPEC behavior. In the high oil price case, jet fuel 
is forecasted to climb to $4.72/gallon by 2020 and $5.33/gallon (2008 dollars) by 2035. It is likely that jet fuel prices 
will remain volatile and may repeat events similar to the fuel price surge examined in this paper.  





 Increased oil-based fuel costs would 
create an incentive to transition to long-
term purchase agreements of alternative 
fuels and to reduce fuel burn through the 
implementation of efficiency measures 
in aircraft design, operations, and air 
transportation networks. 
B. Fuel Efficiency Measures 
In order to reduce the effects of 
increasing effective fuel costs, airlines 
can adopt fuel efficiency improvements 
using a portfolio of measures that 
include technology improvements, 
operation optimizations, and alternative 
fuels (Sgouridis, Bonnefoy, and 
Hansman 2009)22. Engine and 
aerodynamic efficiency have historically 
improved at a rate of 1.5% and 0.4% per 
year, respectively (Lee et. al., 2001)23. 
This trend continued in the past decade, 
as shown in Figure 15. US domestic 
passenger carrier fuel intensity decreased 
an average of 1.6%/year 2000-2009, as 
calculated by fuel issued and ASM 
reported on BTS Form 41 Schedule T2. 
Aircraft require long research and 
development times and the turnover time 
for the global aviation fleet is 
approximately 20-25 years, so it is 
unlikely that these efficiency 
improvement rates will increase 
dramatically fleet wide in the near future. In the short term, new operational procedures may reduce fuel burn, 
although infrastructure changes have significant lead times (Lee et. al. 2009)24. Fuel efficiency measures are 
unlikely to buffer airlines from volatility in crude oil prices and increases in the effective cost of fuel, motivating the 
need to understand how air transportation systems will adapt and what the potential social and economic 
consequences are from increases in the effective cost of fuel. 
C. Social and Economic Impacts of Reductions in Air Service 
 Goetz and Sutton (1997)25 used a core-periphery structure to explain the geographic effects of deregulation on 
the airline industry from 1978-1993. Their findings showed that core centers (the large hubs and international 
gateways, such as Chicago, Atlanta and New York) benefited more than the periphery spoke cities from increased 
air transportation employment, frequency of service, passenger flow, and lower fares, except where one or two 
airlines dominated a hub. If the observed impacts of the fuel price surge were to become permanent, lasting social 
and economic effects could occur, continuing the geographic trends of deregulation. 
 Airports provide numerous benefits to their region of service, including: reduced travel time and cost, enable 
businesses and healthcare procedures requiring time sensitive shipments, civil defense, stimulation of regional 
business, access to the national airport system, and recreation. Economic impacts have been described as direct, 
indirect, induced, and catalytic. The direct and indirect regional economic impacts of airports can be estimated using 
FAA guidelines. These impacts scale with the number of commercial passengers and airport-based aircraft. In 1992, 
Butler and Kiernan26 estimated an airport with 50 based aircraft induced an annual benefit of $615,500 and provided 
annual payroll of $304,500, while an airport with 50 based aircraft and 50,000 annual commercial customers 
induced $1,672,500 of annual benefit and $1,827,000 of annual payroll (1992 dollars). Reductions in service and the 
acompanying passenger traffic to small airports could limit the financial viability of many airports, depriving 
inhabitants in the airport’s catchment area of these benefits. 
 
Figure 14: EIA Jet Fuel Price Forecast. Data Source: (EIA, 2010)21 
 
 
Figure 15. US Passenger Carrier Domestic Fuel Intensity, 2000-2009.  
Data Source: (BTS Form 41 T2,2010)6  
 





 Malina, Schwab and Wollersheim (2007)27 used a contingent valuation approach for a secondary airport in 
Germany and its catchment area to quantify the catalytic effect for regional economies that are induced by airports. 
Their study provided insights as to which industries benefit the most from the airport and the value companies place 
on airports. Ishutkina and Hansman (2008)28 described the interaction between air transportation and economic 
activity in different regions of the world. By examining links between economic development and air tranportation, 
they showed how different regions have developed air transportation systems to generate comparative advantages. 
For example, the diversification of the United Arab Emirates economy to include logistics operations, tourist 
attractions, and the fresh flower industry. Jamaica is dependent on air transportation to bring tourists to the island 
whose spending promotes economic growth. If a large number of communities in the United States were to lose 
access to the air transportation system, economic opportunties that paralell those experienced at the international 
level could be lost at the local level. This potentialility could warrant government action. 
D. Public Policies to Reduce Social and Economic Impacts 
 To ensure small communities 
maintained a link to the national air 
transportation system, Congress 
established the Essential Air Service 
(EAS) program when it passed the 
Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. EAS 
provides subsidies to airlines for 
otherwise unprofitable routes between 
communities that had air service prior to 
deregulation and hub airports. A 
reduction in the financial viability of 
service to small communities may result 
in increased government subsidies to 
commercial aviation in attempts to 
maintain regional benefits. Figure 16 
shows that continental US EAS 
subsidies have doubled from $79.5 
million in 2003 to $163 million in 2010.8 
The largest annual increase occurred 
between 2007 and 2008 when subsidies increased $34.5 million to $131 million. The recent trend has been for more 
communities to require subsidized service as the number of continental US communities receiving subsidized 
service increased 19%, from 90 in 2003 to 107 in 2010. In July 2007, the population in the catchment areas‡‡ of the 
communities with regular service provided by EAS subsidized routes averaged ~170,000, for a total of ~6% of the 
continental US population, based on year 2000 census data.12 EAS subsidies improve access to the national air 
transportation system for a significant portion of the population. Historically, governments have intervened to 
provide subsidies to commercial aviation proceeding calamitous events, such as 9/11. Industry adjustment to 
permanent increases in the effective cost of fuel could result in further government subsidies.  
 In 2008, three EAS carriers serving 37 communities ceased operations. 30 communities were temporarily 
without EAS air service for up to 10 months and 6 for a longer period of time (GAO, 2009)9. Although the EAS 
mechanism was able to return service to these communities, this prolonged interruption likely resulted in social and 
economic effects of lost air service. The number of carriers providing EAS service has declined from 34 in February 
1987 to 10 in May 2010. In the event of future shocks to the airline industry it is likely that small communities will 
face interruptions in air service. Changes to the EAS mechanism may be required to mitigate negative impacts. 
 GAO (2003)29 recommended more flexibility to be built into the EAS program, including eliminating subsidized 
service to certain communities that are relatively close to other larger airports, providing eligible communities with 
grants to allow them to tailor air service to unique local needs, and allowing carriers to operate smaller aircraft that 
are more suited to local levels of demand. If small communities continue to require more subsidies to maintain air 
service, Congress will need to decide what level of access to air service is acceptable and what level of subsidies it is 
willing to provide. Although non-hub airports account for ~72% of continental US airports with commercial service, 
they account for only ~9% of departures, which are generally performed in smaller aircraft over shorter stage 
                                                           
‡‡ Catchment area defined as the area of shortest great circle distance to the airport, as calculated using Thiessen polygons in 
ESRI’s ArcGISTM. 
 
Figure 16. EAS Subsidies and Continental US Communities Served 
by EAS. Source: (Office of Aviation Analysis, 2010)8  





lengths, resulting in smaller environmental impacts than large jets from large airports. When considering climate 
change and energy legislature, Congress will need to weigh the social and economic benefits of air service in small 
communities against the limited potential for reductions in environmental impacts. 
VI. Conclusions 
Using the 2004-08 fuel price surge as a natural experiment, it has been shown that connections to non-hub 
airports serving small communities were most sensitive to effective fuel cost increases. It was found that non-hub 
airports lost 12% of connections, compared to an average loss of 2.8%, July 2004-08. The complete loss of service 
July 2007-08 at 70 non-hub airports, representing 14% of continental US airports with commercial service, resulted 
in an average driving time of 75 minutes to the next nearest airport with service. It is believed that reduced access to 
the national air transportation system had social and economic effects for small communities. The cessation of 
operations of Air Midwest and Big Sky Airlines, the sole carriers serving 20 communities in July 2007, resulted in 
much of the volatility in airports with service 2007-08. Regional and commuter airlines were less able to handle fuel 
cost volatility during this period as ten declared bankruptcy. To maintain historic levels of access to the air 
transportation system, funding for Essential Air Service (EAS) subsidized routes has doubled since 2003 while the 
number of continental US communities serviced by subsidized routes has increased 19% to 107 in 2010. Even 
though subsidies have increased, 36 airports were without service for 10 months or longer following the 2008 fuel 
price surge. If small communities continue to require more subsidies to maintain air service, Congress will need to 
decide what level of access to air service is acceptable, what level of subsidies it is willing to provide, and how 
flexibility can be designed into programs to reduce interruptions in air service to small communities in the future. 
Increases in the effective cost of aviation fuel could result from escalating crude oil prices and environmental 
driven costs (i.e. from cap and trade schemes or taxes). Complementary analyses of aircraft fuel efficiency, airline 
economics, and airfares provided a basis for understanding some airline decisions during the fuel price surge that 
can be extrapolated to examine future trends. Increased effective fuel costs will provide incentives for airlines to 
improve fleet fuel efficiency, reducing the environmental effects of aviation, but may cause an uneven distribution 
of social and economic impacts as airline networks adapt. As fuel costs increased 2004-08, utilization of older and 
fuel inefficient aircraft was reduced while the number of operating turboprops increased. Permanent effective fuel 
cost increase will likely lead to increased adoption rates of CO2 mitigating measures which reduce fuel burn, such as 
aircraft technology innovations, optimized operational procedures, and network changes. Benefits due to reductions 
in the environmental impacts of aviation may be balanced by social and economic costs. Government action may be 
required to determine acceptable levels of access to service as the air transportation system transitions to higher fuel 
costs. 
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Appendix A: Airline Classification 
Although it is expected that carriers within the same classification vary significantly in their businesses, markets, 
and operations, airlines were classified to simplify the presentation of data. The following categories were used to 
group airlines with similar business models, based on common practices found in the literature and the authors’ 
discretion. The top two US airlines in each category, by July 2007 available seat miles (ASM), are listed: 
 
• Network Legacy Carrier (NLC) – airlines that flew interstate routes prior to deregulation in 1978, have 
international operations, and are certified under Part 121 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
including American Airlines and United Air Lines. 
• Low Cost Carrier (LCC) – airlines that have a stated low fare business model, and are certified under Part 
121 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, including Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways. 
• Regional – feeder, charter, and commuter airlines that fly aircraft less than 100 seats, and are certified under 
Part 121 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, including Skywest Airlines and Expressjet Airlines. 
• Commuter – commuter and on demand airlines that are certified under Part 135 of Title 14 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, including Hageland Aviation Service and Boston-Maine Airways. 
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